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Wallets No. 000311

Qubic Loses $1.3 Million and Halts the Chain to Keep the Rest

1,404 wallets, one weak seed generator, and 87% of the loot sitting in place because the chain was stopped.

Between 23:42 UTC on October 17 and 01:26 UTC on October 18, an attacker drained 1,404 Qubic wallets of about 2.94 trillion QU, worth about $1.3 million[1][2]. The chain stopped at tick 85,371,949[2].

Qubic blamed seeds made with too little randomness. “The issue was in seed generation, not in the Qubic protocol itself.”[3]

Most of the money is stuck. About 87.1% of the drained QU never left the network and sits frozen on-chain; the other 12.9% reached MEXC, which froze the receiving account within an hour[4]. Bitget suspended all QUBIC deposits and withdrawals as a precaution[5].

What to do: update to client 4.26.4, which Qubic says fixes how seeds are made[6].

Who gains, who loses

[4] MEXC holds the only clean exit and froze it inside an hour; the attacker keeps 87.1% parked on a stopped chain, and holders' recovery now depends on the quorum, not the explorer.
[6] affected holders get a client patch and a vote, not a payout; the Computor quorum decides compensation, so the loss waits on governance.
[2] the theft window is 104 minutes; anyone whose Qubic key came from the old client was exposed for that whole stretch before the chain was halted.

Receipts

[1]

Qubic paused its mainnet on October 18, 2026, after an attacker drained 1,404 user wallets of approximately 2.94 trillion QU tokens, worth approximately $1.3 million at the time.

“Qubic, a decentralized AI computing network, paused its mainnet on October 18, 2026, after an attacker drained 1,404 user wallets.”

[2]

The Qubic attack ran from 23:42 UTC on October 17 to 01:26 UTC on October 18, and validators then stopped the chain at tick 85,371,949.

“The attack ran from 23:42 UTC on October 17 to 01:26 UTC on October 18.”

[3]

Qubic attributed the theft to wallet seeds generated with insufficient randomness, and the project said "The issue was in seed generation, not in the Qubic protocol itself."

“According to the project: "The issue was in seed generation, not in the Qubic protocol itself.”

[4]

About 87.1% of the drained QU never left the Qubic network and is now immobilized on-chain, while the remaining 12.9% made it to MEXC, which froze the receiving account within 1 hour on suspicion that it was linked to the attack.

“The remaining 12.9% made it to MEXC. The exchange froze the receiving account within 1 hour on suspicion that it was linked to the attack.”

[5]

Bitget suspended all QUBIC deposits and withdrawals as a separate precaution while the Qubic situation played out.

“Bitget took a separate precaution, suspending all QUBIC deposits and withdrawals while the situation played out.”

[6]

Qubic said it corrected the seed-generation weakness in client version 4.26.4, and that any resolution of compensation for affected holders rests with the Computor quorum.

“Qubic's team pushed out client version 4.26.4 to fix the seed-generation weakness.”

Cabal Desk is reporting, written with AI under human oversight. Every bracketed number opens its receipt: the source, the quoted span, the hash. Headlines and characterisations are commentary; the sourced facts are the receipts. Not investment advice. Corrections log. Editorial & legal.